
La Quadrature Du Cercle

√π

The APTS That Weren't








La cuadrature du cercle **La cuadratura del circulo** Die Quadratur des Kreises Squaring the circle квадрату́ра кру́га



Marion Marschalek


maríon@cyphort.com @pínkflawd






What makes an APT

Reconnaissance – gather information Incursion - break in Discovery - look around Capture – collect goods Exfiltration – get goods out



The single most beautiful APT

November 2013 Target Corporation suffered one of the most severe large-scale retail hacks in US history




Memory scraping on running processes, fetching card data

Dumping data to a file on a share, regularly pushing out to C&C




ADVANCED we don't [əd'va:n(t)st] understand it

we detected it **DERSISTENT** too late **[pə'sistənt]**






Threat detection always relies on patterns.



Why oh why can't we find it?




I CAN SEE DEAD PATTERNS ...













Cheshire Cat

Checking for running security processes

Orchestrator component executing binaries from disk





Prepared to run on _old_ Windows versions Using APIs deprecated after Win95/98/ME Function to check for the MZ value, the PE value and the NE value







Implementation traits and user agent string indicate Win NT 4.0 as target platform

Persists as shell extension for the icon handler Wants to run in the context of the 'Progman' window



Implant to monitor network activity





Evasive when network sniffer products are running

Super stealthy network communication: Versatile communication method 9+ C&C servers, infrequent intervals Communication done through injected standard browser instance






Fine tuned to paddle around Kaspersky security products







Nation State Cyber Espionage?



From Bahrain With Gove

FinFisher Suite from Gamma International UK Ltd.

Sent to Bahraini pro-democracy activists

00003960	47	4e	55	20	4d	50	3a	20	43	61	6e	6e	6f	74	20	61	GNU MP: Cannot a
00003970	6C	6C	6f	63	61	74	65	20	6d	65	6d	6f	72	79	20	28	[llocate memory (]
00003980	73	69	7a	65	3d	25	75	29	0a	00	00	00	47	4e	55	20	size=%u)GNU
00003990	4d	50	3a	20	43	61	6e	6e	6f	74	20	72	65	61	6c	6C	MP: Cannot reall
000039a0	6f	63	61	74	65	20	6d	65	6d	6f	72	79	20	28	6f	6C	ocate memory (ol)
000039b0	64	5f	73	69	7a	65	3d	25	75	20	6e	65	77	5f	73	69	d_size=%u new_si
000039c0	7a	65	3d	25	75	29	θa	00	79	За	5c	6C	73	76	6e	5f	ze=%u)y:\lsvn
000039d0	62	72	61	бe	63	68	65	73	5c	66	69	6e	73	70	79	76	branches\finspyv
000039e0	34	2e	30	31	5c	66	69	6e	73	70	79	76	32	5c	73	72	4.01\finspyv2\sr
000039f0	63	5c	6C	69	62	73	5c	6C	69	62	67	6d	70	5c	6d	70	<pre>[c\libs\libgmp\mp]</pre>
00003a00	6e	2d	74	64	69	76	5f	71	72	2e	63	00	63	20	3d	3d	[n-tdiv_qr.c.c ==]
00003a10	20	30	60	80	60	00	60	60	01	02	03	03	04	04	04	04	0

CYPHORT.

http://citizenlab.org/2012/07/from-bahrain-with-love-finfishers-spy-kit-exposed/



MALWARE /'malweig/

Software that doesn't come with an EULA

- Morgan Marquis-Boire



Offense Going Commercial


YPHORT.

SS World Intelligence Support Systems for Lawful Interception, Criminal Investigations and Intelligence Gathering

TeleStrategies









State Sponsored Industrial Espionage

Canada spying on Brazil's N NSA spying on Brazil's Petro France spying on IBM/Texa China spying on about ever




THREAT DETECTION INDUSTRY

http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/brazil-canada-espionage-which-countries-are-we-spying-on-1.1930522 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-08/u-s-government-spied-on-brazil-s-petrobras-globo-tv-reports http://www.nytimes.com/1990/11/18/world/french-said-to-spy-on-us-computer-companies.html



How Threat-Detection went Threat-Intel





Malware.. 'watching' Actor tracking Publicity APT numbering, logos & names



FRENEMIES & THE FUNCIONS MONCLUS

Or: When Malware Became Intellectual Property



Intelli.. wot?


- Reverse engineering turns political when you take apart the wrong binaries
 - mass malware => targeted malware => nation state malware
 - mass malware <= targeted malware <= nation state malware
- Marketing and publicity?
 - Bad for business in the long run
 - Blowing up e.g. Spanish government ops might not help contracting with them in the future
- Providing offenders with free audits



Ethical Questions In APT Research

"... if the malware is detected, it will also make it **easier for extremists to protect themselves** against cyber spying attempts."

"... the researcher's insight into the operation [...] is always superficial. At first glance, it might appear that the **targeted entity is "innocent"**, such as an academic or a journalist, but in reality they **could be a radical academic or a terrorism-facilitating journalist**."




http://www.securityweek.com/long-term-strategy-needed-when-analyzing-apts-researcher

row row row your boat

shut the fuck up carl

DPM0t?







Cyber Attribution

You may not know who launched that cyber attack against you, but we do.

Stickers

Dice

Warenkorb Artikel hierher ziehen und ablegen Warenkorb anzeigen

Latest Update

2015.03.13

Kategorie: Shop Hacktivist USA Brute Force XSS Dice Want custom dice? Got some other product you



Country Attribution Die \$5.00

Einlogo

NSA Actor Attribution Die \$5.00

Hack Civise



\$5.00



Ahmed Mansoor

and the UAE Five




]HackingTeam[

Rely on us.

Sometimes Attribution isn't Tricky

83.111.56.188


inetnum: 83.111.56.184 – 83.111.56.191 netname: minaoffice-EMIRNET descr: Office Of Sh. Tahnoon Bin Zayed Al Nahyan descr: P.O. Box 5151 ,Abu Dhabi, UAE country: AE





APT Attribution Cheatsheet

Any need for actor **attribution**? – Most likely **no**. Any need for actor **tracking**? – In certain cases, **maybe**. Any need for actor(-tool) **recognition**? – Probably, **yes**.





Sony breach linked to Armenian organized criminal group

Executive Summary

On November 24, 2014, personally identifiable information about Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE) employees and their dependents, e-mails between employees, information about executive salaries at the company, copies of unreleased Sony films, and other information, was obtained and released by a hacker group going under the moniker "Guardians of Peace" or "GOP".

Although the motives for the hack have yet to be revealed, the hack has been tied to the planned release of the film The Interview, which depicts an assassination attempt on North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, with the hackers threatening acts of terrorism if the film were to be released.

Recently, a team of 5 researchers from Mandiant/FireEye examined the evidence left behind by the attackers. This research has provided insight into the likely source of these attacks. Though not definitive, our analysis provides a much clearer picture and suggests an organized criminal group operating out of the Republic of Armenia is responsible for the data breach impacting Sony Pictures Entertainment. This diclosure casts further doubt on the FBI's assertion that the attack was carried out by state-sponsored actors under the control of North Korea, a theory that has been all but discredited by a host of security professionals since the attack became public, including DeVry graduate Luciano Lariviere.

I don't think North Korea did it.

- Luciano Lariviere, DeVry graduate

The research team is guite certain, however, that the Guardians of Peace hacker group played no role in this attack. The clues left behind confirm that the group claiming responsibility were a fabrication to throw investigators off the trail and to mask the true source.

Links to Armenia

The research team was able to reconstruct the attack from the ground up and discovered a number of IP addresses that are linked to other attacks that have been attributed to actors in Armenia as well as the presence of Armenian text in the comment strings of the malware that was recovered during the forensic investigation. Some of these malware samples have also been used in Armenian attacks.

Timeline of Events



Date	Description					
October 19, 2014	Initial introduction of malware to the SPE computing environment. Malware is delivered using a "spear phishing" message targeted at a high level executive with subject line "Special request from James Franco"					
November 7.	Malware begins communicating with C2 server at 217.96.33.165. Malware begins to spread using SMB shares and credentials obtained from the C2.					


Squaring The Circle?



"An attacker only needs to find one weakness while the defender needs to find every one."

"Defender Economics", Andreas Lindh, Troopers15

"When Threat Intel met DFIR" Chopitea & Mouchoux, hack.lu 2015



Threat modeling Compartmentalization 2-factor Authentication Encryption Secrecy

Thank You

maríon@cyphort.com @pínkflawd



Resources

http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/brazil-canada-espionage-which-countries-are-we-spying-on-1.1930522 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-08/u-s-government-spied-on-brazil-s-petrobras-globo-tv-reports http://www.nytimes.com/1990/11/18/world/french-said-to-spy-on-us-computer-companies.html http://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-14/ftp/cyber_espionage/ http://media.kaspersky.com/pdf/Guerrero-Saade-VB2015.pdf http://www.securityweek.com/long-term-strategy-needed-when-analyzing-apts-researcher https://cryptome.org/2013/03/call-to-cyber-arms.pdf http://archive.hack.lu/2015/When%20threat%20intel%20met%20DFIR.pdf http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1305571.shtml http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-34360934

