Pole Vaulting over Agile Security Pits



Daniel Liber

~whoami

- Current: Security Leader @ CyberArk
 - Product security
 - Strategy and process driven
 - A pain in the insecurity's a\$\$

- Past @ multiple places
 - Consulting, Research, PT



~whereami

- CyberArk
 - Privileged account security
 - Look us up (we're hiring ☺)

www.cyberark.com/





~quote

"Sometimes you just have to jump off the cliff without knowing where you will land"





~agenda

- Agile, a reminder
- SDLC and Agile
- Collaboration with R&D for security
- Crunching numbers Why is this issue so important?



So... Agile?

Individuals and interactions over processes and tools

Working software over

comprehensive documentation

Customer collaboration over


contract negotiation

Responding to change over following a plan



So... Agile?

Scrum:





So... Agile?


Kanban:





Reflecting on Agile:

"Deliver working software frequently, from a couple of weeks to a couple of months, with a preference to the shorter timescale."






- Vendor SDLC programs
 - Microsoft
 - SAP
 - Cisco
 - Etc...
- Maturity Models
 - OWASP SAMM
 - BSIMM
- NIST

<Compatibility issues>





Bryan Sullivan (Microsoft) @ BlackHat 2010





Some examples of every-sprint requirements include:

- Run analysis tools daily or per build (see Tooling and Automation later in the Applying SDL Tasks to Sprints section).
- Threat model all new features (see Threat Modeling: The Cornerstone of the SDL later in the Applying SDL Tasks to Sprints section).
- Ensure that each project member has completed at least one security training course in the past year (see Security Education later in the Applying SDL Tasks to Sprints section).
- Use filtering and escaping libraries around all web output.
- Use only strong crypto in new code (AES, RSA, and SHA-256 or better).

(Microsoft SDL for Agile)








Reflecting on Agile:

"Welcome changing requirements, even late in development."

→ Threat modeling not only for new features, but also for **CHANGED** features





Threat Modeling

- Approach:
 - Attack / software / asset centric
- Mapping
 - Assets / Actors / Entry points
- Flow
 - Data / Process / Logic



Not as lightweight as expected from a sprint task



Coordinating with Product Owner Emperor of the backlog


- Product's roadmap
- 'Sensitive' features attention
- Setting security sprints (bucket security tasks)
- Cut-off for most important threats





Reflecting on Agile:

"The most efficient and effective method of conveying information to and within a development team is face-to-face conversation."










Pop Quiz

- Sprint of 2 weeks
- Overlooking 4 teams
- Participating in every daily (15 minutes long)



10 days X 4 teams X 15 min.

= 10 hours ~ 1 day = 10% of your time



Security Champions

Team's "security bouncer"


- Why?
 - Probably knows the product better
 - Reports back on security aspects
- Who?
 - Curious, security friendly
- Growth potential join the dark side





Reflecting on Agile:

"The best architectures, requirements, and designs emerge from selforganizing teams."



→ Teams contain different positions, responsibilities, practices and quite versatile



The Team



Team Leader



Developer / Architect



QA



System Analyst



← The Security Guy





Customized Training

- Stop using 'one session fits all'
- Create tracks per position
- Use examples from your products
- Track, certify, re-certify

Flexibility in carrying out security tasks



Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Opt.

Opt.

Opt.

Yes

Opt.

Opt.

Yes (no

test)

Opt.

Opt.

test)

Opt.

Opt.

Yes (no

test)

Yes (no

PM

Optional

Optional

Optional

Optional

Optional

Optional

Yes (no

test)

	960	unity	Collaborations			
Training Name	Developer	Architects	Functional Analyst	Security Team	QA	Team Leaders

Yes

Yes

Optional

Optional

Optional

Optional

Optional

Yes

Yes

Yes

Optional

Optional

Optional

Optional

Basic Security

Secure Design

Development

Adv. Security

Management

Training

Security

Analysis

Secure

Security

Testing

Testing

Risk

Yes

Optional

Optional

Optional

Optional

Optional

Yes

Track of insecure software:

- Requirements
- Design
- Coding
- Testing

Development

Release


- Distributing
- Deploying
- Feedback / IR

- Researching
- Exploiting
- Pivoting

Abuse




"We will fix it post release!"



Jeremiah Grossman WhiteHat Security AppSec Israel 2015




"Ok. BUT – if our software causes a breach, the customer will surely detect it."



Global Advanced Threat Landscape Survey CyberArk 2015




"I'm sure that there are other factors for a breach than bad practices of development and deployment"



Global Advanced Threat Landscape Survey CyberArk 2015




"It doesn't matter as a lot of companies secure their networks anyways against breaches"



Analyzing Real-World Exposure to Windows Credential Theft Attacks CyberArk Labs 2015



(Size does not matter, in this case.)



Analyzing Real-World Exposure to Windows Credential Theft Attacks CyberArk Labs 2015



Conclusions

- Agile is a modern methodology for software development which is commonly used
 - In theory security could be integrated
 - In practice there are some glitches
- Don't be afraid to adjust (use the in this ppt)
- There is a long chain of product security
 - SDLC is first in line
 - You really don't want to experience security incident down the chain



Questions?

Thank you!

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